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Abstract
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empower women in developing nations. First conceived by the Bangladeshi economist Muhammed
Yunus and the bank he founded, microfinance has been hailed as a visionary project that promises to
advance the economic interests of the poor by engaging them directly. Conventional studies by political
scientists explore the place of microfinance in the global development architecture of international
financial institutions, governments, and NGOs. Economic studies of its effectiveness are contributing to a
crisis of legitimacy since they reveal that thousands of clients in developing nations continue to default
on their loans due to predatory lending practices. Drawing on discourse analysis methodology, this article
seeks to explain how microfinance, an industry embedded in the financialization of development, is now
concerned with high financial returns for investments, not the social goals promised by its original raison
d'être. Treating microfinance as a discourse, I argue that there is a fundamental tension between the
short-term social goals promised by microfinance and the long-term financial objectives of sustainability
of investors.
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I. Introduction
Microfinance is one of the most important economic phenomena since the advent of capitalism
and Adam Smith.
(Vinod Khosla, Silicon Valley venture capitalist, 20041)

In the discourse of development – where everyone professes a will to improve the status
quo – poverty remains an insoluble problem. Originally, the project of international development
was inaugurated by U.S. President Harry Truman during the time of embedded liberalism and
Keynesian economics after the Second World War. Development consisted of economic policies
designed to assist poor nations and reduce global inequality by increasing the flow of aid from
the Global North to the Global South. In the 21st century, however, the goals, purpose and
methods of development have shifted from their earlier iterations. Rather than empowering
national economies in the developing world, millennial development now aims to alleviate
poverty as its first priority, taking as its guiding framework of metrics the Millennium
Development Goals adopted by the United Nations. Books like the economist Jeffrey Sachs’ The
End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time2 and humanitarian rock stars like Bono
from U23 now herald anti-poverty campaigns as the goal and responsibility that industrialized
societies have towards their non-industrialized counterparts.
During the 1980s, industrial development came to be associated with policies centered on
the international financial institutions – the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Bank
of International Settlements – that actively promoted the privatization, deregulation and
liberalization of world markets and became known as “The Washington Consensus.” Yet, after
consecutive financial crises like the 1982 Latin American Debt Crisis and the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis,4 other alternatives were considered by policymakers to replace the ineffective
and discredited policies of the Washington Consensus. To solve this crisis of credibility in
development circles, policymakers sought a concept that resonated with the poor and powerless.
One manifestation of this was the financial instrument known hereafter as “microfinance.” Its
pro-poor and participatory policies were considered just, effective and a new paradigm for
development that reversed the failures of its 20th century predecessor. Microfinance represented a
rupture with the past.
From its inception, microfinance was designed to provide financial services to the poor. It
operates under the logic that lending small amounts to the poorest of the poor is a viable solution
to eradicate poverty. Its founder, the Bangladeshi economist Muhammed Yunus, a self-anointed
“Banker to the Poor,”5 made as his point of departure the premise that “poverty is the absence of
all human rights.”6 Yunus’ innovative vision targeted not only the poor, but lowest stratum of the
poor. More than any other downtrodden group, Yunus sought with microfinance to assist and
empower women.
Conceptually, microfinance rests its assumptions on the attractive entrepreneurial spirit of
individuals. Unlike other policies seeking to alleviate poverty, it does not depend on a faceless
mass of bureaucrats with no connection to their recipients. Thus microfinance does not rely on
development aid or public spending. Rather, it focuses on bringing the borrowing institution and
the lender into a relationship that excludes the state or any intermediary agent or institution. In
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this respect, microfinance is consistent with the millennial goal of poverty eradication through its
pronounced distance from notions of economic growth in developing nations.
However, despite its lofty aspirations and innovative approach, a critical examination of
microfinance reveals that microfinancial institutions comprise a profitable industry with ties and
links to international finance and the unpopular institutions it claims to replace. While
microfinance finds appeal by promoting democracy, strengthening social capital ties and
broadening human capital networks, it has also become an exploitative constellation of
institutions that leave those they claim to help in worse conditions than they were originally. By
targeting women primarily, microfinancial institutions claim to empower the most vulnerable
sectors of society. By promoting communitarian networks and greater interconnection in civil
society, microfinancial institutions also claim to fortify the glue that holds societies together.
And by encouraging participatory systems of voting and representation, microfinancial
institutions claim to be leading developing countries into new frontiers of democratic
industrialization. Yet the thousands of women who have partaken in microfinancial initiatives
have now been victims of predatory lending schemes with exorbitant interest rates that are
beyond their abilities of re-payment.
This article explains how microfinance, an industry embedded in the financialization of
development, is now concerned with high financial returns for investments, not the social goals
promised by its original raison d'être. It asks two fundamental questions about its concepts and
practices. First, what is microfinance supposed to do? Answering this question requires a broad
examination of the various financial services that are furnished by microfinancial institutions
(MFIs), including micro-lending, savings, remittances, micro-insurance and, in the case of Haiti,
promoting participatory democracy, social capital and human capital. Moreover, microfinance
relies on two different logics of democracy and social capital versus profitability and financial
sustainability for investors. If these two logics are contradictory or mutually exclusive, how can
these logics enter into conversation with one another for microfinance to sustain its credibility
and continue to exist? My argument is that there is a fundamental tension between the short-term
social goals promised by microfinance and the long-term financial objectives of sustainability of
investors. Because microfinance no longer serves as a tool to eradicate poverty but also for
greater investments and profitability, microfinancial institutions use discourses of democracy,
social capital, human capital and empowerment to sustain their financial practices and continue
bringing the poor into its bankable sectors. By incorporating new borrowers into capital markets
that exceed local or national boundaries, microfinancial subjects become dependent to the same
institutions that claim to free them from poverty and social exclusion. It is this fundamental
tension between these contradictory logics that animates my argument.
Methodologically, I use the discourse analysis method of qualitative research employed
forcefully by the philosopher Michel Foucault in his books and lectures. Foucault starts from the
premise that discourse is a set of language practices, debates and incitements that require us to
choose particular textual representations in particular instances. Foucault also considered every
act to be embedded in a network of material practices; he rejected the traditional dichotomy
made between ideational factors and material factors by arguing that they are deeply imbricated
in each other. A discourse analysis requires identifying the historical conditions of possibility
under which a phenomenon in question comes to the fore. Additionally, discourse analysis
examines the various ways that discourse operates: first, by identifying the logic of the argument
in the text and examining how the concepts are related to one another; second, by understanding
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its effects, implications and ramifications. I also use Foucault’s concept of “governmentality”
introduced during his lectures at the Collège de France to understand new forms of governing
that are traditionally emanating from the state. I use his concept of governmentality to illustrate
how the recipients of microcredit are governed through new technologies of government that
create, arrange and reconfigure subjects in developing countries.
As my case study, I examine a Caribbean country in the western hemisphere with a
chronic history of poverty and scarcity: Haiti. Faced with an earthquake with enormous
devastating consequences, the poorest nation in the western hemisphere is now a primal site for
microfinancial initiatives and growing scales of privatization schemes. Taking Haiti as an
empirical account, this article seeks to explain how the financialization of microfinance can be
seen as a new form of governmentality - embodied by the constellation of the Haitian state,
microfinancial institutions and international financial markets - aimed to create new subjects and
produce discursive knowledge about them.
Using the interpretive methods of critical discourse analysis, I examined primary
documents produced and disseminated by institutions concerned with microfinancial
development, including international financial institutions (The World Bank, GCAP),
microfinancial institutions (Fonkoze, SOGESOL, Finca Haiti, BRAC development, Institute of
Development), and philanthropic organizations whose funds are channeled to smaller NGOs
operating on the ground (Clinton Global Initiative, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). I browsed
a diverse collection of texts: from their mission statements and annual reports to articles and blog
entries published on their websites. My objective is to discover, highlight and thematize how
textual discursive practices allow us to understand the production of truth and power in
microfinance. Drawing on the events in Haiti before and after the 2010 earthquake, this article
explores how development projects such as microfinance produce knowledge about subjects in
order to legitimize their practices.
There has been a wide-range of critical theoretical literature that situates microfinance in
broader systems of financialization and modes of governance. Political anthropologists and
geographers such as Li, Escobar, Ferguson and Watts are critical of the different ways that
development programs create new forms of governance worldwide.7 Weber has noted the double
processes of financialization of microfinance are tied to the neoliberal programs of deregulation
of finance and liberalization of trade.8 Aitken argues that microfinance is another facet of
neoliberalism – a political rationality that prioritizes the market, seeks minimum state
interference, based largely on risk assessment strategies and the unstoppable search for favorable
business climates.9 For Delaney, microfinance serves as a set of technologies of power that
increase state power through the market.10 Roy, on the other hand, draws on the work of the
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to postulate a new type of capital, “poverty capital,” referring to the
effort made by financial institutions to capitalize on poverty. Poverty capital is engendered and
circulated by international financial institutions and development agencies. Their aim is to profit
from microfinance initiatives and to produce, circulate and regulate knowledge about the very
poor and its most vulnerable members, including women and children.
But how do the discourses of social and human capital interact with financial
sustainability for investors? How do microfinancial institutions use these discourses to find
appeal with investors while creating new markets and high margins of profitable success? One of
the best ways to answer this question, I argue, is through the discourse analysis method that
compares the statements and documents released by development agencies. The goal in mind is
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to understand microfinance discourse as a form of governmentality that hides beneath its public
narrative. Foucault’s method of discourse analysis and his concept of governmentality describes
this best, since governmentality is concerned with the “conduct of conducts” and “the diverse
forms of practice requires to render objects governable in particular ways.”11 Whereas the term
“governance” is usually conceptualized within a centered network of institutions,
governmentality relates to the different ways that subjects come to govern themselves and others.
"It seeks out an analysis of the diverse assemblages of knowledge and practice through which
objects become governable in distinct ways.”12By employing these methods to textual analysis of
development agencies in Haiti, my contribution to the literature is to extend and broaden the
work done by critical development theorists on Haiti, investigate how these discourses operate in
a post-natural disaster scenario, and understand how the two contradictory logics of microfinance
operate at large. To that extent, the goal of my project is tease out the diverse and heterogeneous
practices of governmentality that are seen through finance; the focus is on how knowledge of
populations is a production of power, not simply on the material power as traditionally
conceived.
Drawing from the work of theorists like Roy, Delaney, Weber and Aitken, I agree with
their assumption that microfinance has been financialized and offers financial services that are
incongruent with the social goals that it had originally in mind. But whereas the literature on
critical development studies centers around Africa or South Asia, my article focuses on Haiti, the
poorest country in the Caribbean and the Western Hemisphere. Although theorists like Aitken
have applied discourse analysis to Latin American countries like Mexico, no one has either
worked on Haiti or any other country in the Caribbean. What makes Haiti a special case is that it
was flooded with microfinancial institutions after the earthquake. Whereas Aitken focuses on the
transformation of NGOs into commercial financial institutions, this article, on the other hand,
centers on microfinance, particularly as it is concerned with Haiti as a primal site of post-disaster
reconstruction. My contribution to the literature is to demonstrate that microfinance, as a method
of development, is another example of governmentality in Haiti, a case study absent in this
literature.

II. The Origins and Logic of Microfinance
Microfinance is defined as the extension of credit to small groups of poor populations to
fund micro-enterprise activities of their own. First conceived by the Bangladeshi economist
Muhammed Yunus and the bank he founded, the Grameen Bank, microfinance is unique because
it promises to advance the economic interests of the poor by engaging them directly.13 Yunus has
boldly declared that access to credit is a human right, and with microfinance he sees a unique
vehicle for empowering the poor and their rights. According to the New York Times, “in the
decades since Mr. Yunus' first loan, microcredit has become one of the most popular antipoverty
strategies in the world."14
The impact of microfinance can be gauged by the number of people who have in one way
or another been affected by microfinance: In 2009, according to the Microfinance Summit
Campaign, 128 million people worldwide received microfinance loans.15 The Grameen Bank,
which employs 22,000 employees, has issued microcredit loans to 8.36 million people, of whom
97% are women.16 With its universal promises to combat and eradicate poverty in the new
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millennium, microfinance is deemed a panacea for poverty reduction and the most powerful
alternative to state-led development, according to its most ardent advocates. It is a universal
method, for it can be used anywhere, by anyone, at any time. Roy asserts that the “ubiquitous
idea” of microfinance “is lauded and deployed by development institutions and theorists of all
stripes and varying ideologies as an important antidote to poverty.”17
A. The Discourse of Microfinance
For close to 40 years, as microfinance surfaced and became the subject of praise and
adulation by different institutions, it finally captured the public's imagination in the 1990s. As
one analyst put it, "none of the ideas put forth has had greater appeal or more endurance than
microfinance."18 In essence, the normative discourse of microfinance is imbued with a
commitment to reduce poverty and empower women worldwide. As Dichter put it,
"microfinance's anti-poverty promise can be stated in a couple of simple sentences: lend money
to poor people who will invest in tiny businesses, and with their profits pay back the money and
gradually rise out of poverty.”19 Similarly, Lewis T. Preston, former President of the World
Bank, claimed that microfinance is “a particular way of reaching women, thereby helping to
improve the incomes and well-being of their children and families.” 20 Despite its irresistible
appeal, microfinance received an unprecedented degree of attention in 2006 when Muhammed
Yunus received the Nobel Peace Prize for his creation and influence of the Grameen Bank.
“Microcredit has proved to be an important liberating force in societies where women in
particular have to struggle against repressive social and economic conditions,” declared the
committee upon the prize announcement.21 The result of this discourse of empowerment has
been the legitimization of the role of the MFIs in their objectives of poverty reduction.
At the most fundamental level, microcredit is defined as the provision of small loans to
individuals in order to escape poverty, generate their own means of income, and empower
themselves and the groups they belong to. In general, in addition to providing access to credit, it
also provides microfinancial services such as options for insurance schemes or opportunities to
save that enhance microcredit programs.22 The Grameen Bank has been considered an epitome of
microcredit minimalism, or the practice of issuing credit without demanding training obligations,
skills requirements or any conventional type of collateral from the borrower.23 By providing
credit directly to the poor, microfinance supersedes the state as an intermediary between rural
households and international financial markets. This increasing role of eliminating the distance
between microlending agencies and its recipients is seen as one of the prime benefits of
microfinance as an alternative to other development practices.24 Advocates of microfinance also
contend that it may also contribute to the accumulation of assets, reduce vulnerabilities due to
illness, and contribute to better education.25
But the debate is far from settled on whether or not microfinance has been an effective
and sustainable tool for poverty reduction. Different studies have yielded different results in
different parts of the world. A 2009 study conducted by the MIT Poverty Action Lab study in
India showed that microfinance has not had a direct impact or effect on reducing poverty or
economic growth.26 Another study made in Bangladesh found an insignificant impact on the
levels of household consumption before or after the presence of microcredit programs.27
Similarly, a report issued by the UK Department for International Development asserted that “no
clear evidence exists that microfinance programmes [sic] have positive impacts,” concluding that
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“microfinance has to be combined with other interventions.”28 Critics also claim that
microfinance is exclusionary of the poorest of the poor - they point to studies that have found
that it is the “better off” poor rather than the lowest rungs of the poor who benefit from access to
microfinance. 29 Others observe that supply-driven micro-credit initiatives ignore the “informal
finance” practices that the poor resort for their needs. In some cases, recipients use their loans for
emergencies or social traditions instead of entrepreneurial activities. Hence analysts point that,
instead of using micro-loans to generate income, micro-credit borrowers have used their loan
money for “cushioning effects” and “consumption soothing.”30
Notwithstanding its failures, nowhere is the current crisis of microfinance starker than in
its unintended consequences. Analysts say it is impossible to ignore the skyrocketing number of
clients defaulting on their loans and the growing rates of drop-outs.31 Even in those countries
where there's been a rise of microfinance, researchers have observed additional patterns of
delinquency and multiple sources of borrowing by recipients.32 Global institutions like the
International Labor Organization (ILO) now consider that microfinance is an insufficient tool to
combat poverty, arguing that policies that insure farmers against natural disasters are also
necessary.33 The number of success stories are becoming fewer and rarer. "On current evidence,”
writes a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington, “the best estimate of
the average impact of microcredit on the poverty of clients is zero." 34
As
Hermes
and
Lensik put it, “even though several assessments of the impact of microfinance on poverty
reduction have been made, there is surprisingly little solid empirical evidence on this issue.”35 To
that extent, I am not interested in examining whether microfinance is an effective tool for
economic development or whether is sustainable in the long-run. The question I would like to
pose is different: How does the discourse of microfinancial development differ from that of its
borrowers to that of its recipients?
B. The Financialization of Microfinance
Originally, when microfinance was first conceived, it was a visionary and
groundbreaking project. In the last two decades, however, microfinance has been absorbed by
financial industries and become a practice for capital accumulation. Rather than interpreting it as
just another, innovative paradigm of development, we can now speak of microfinance as an
unbridled global industry, one where debt is the ultimate goal:
It is no longer enough then to talk about microfinance as a sector of development. Rather it is
essential to talk about it as a industry where the commodity that is being produced, traded,
and valued is debt.36

Although international financial markets usually stand in contrast to the discourse of aid and
development, microfinance has increasingly been linked with the deregulation of financial
markets worldwide. Microfinance is now associated with the structural adjustment efforts of
neoliberal institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. In this context, the financialization of
microfinance refers to the unprecedented rise in financial practices that are now part of its
lending efforts. As Aitken put it, "financialization has come to refer to the increasing prominence
of financial calculations, practices and identities in domains previously governed in the name of
other kinds of logics, including, recently, the realm of microfinance.”37 For example, the
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Mexican microfinance initiative Compartamos makes a yearly profit of $80 million by lending to
1 million women at interest rates reaching a 90 percent threshold. Whereas the “financial
systems approach” to microfinance emphasizes MFI sustainability over outreach and povertyreduction, the “poverty lending approach” emphasizes poverty reduction by providing credit with
subsidized interest rates. Over the last two decades, the financial systems approach has
prevailed, since MFI sustainability is now prioritized over effective outreach.
One of the promises of microfinance is to incorporate the poorest elements of society into
the economic fabric of developing countries. This level of incorporation relates to the financial
inclusion of those who have been traditionally excluded from access to mainstream financial
institutions. Financial inclusion brings microfinancial institutions - including NGOs, who
become financial intermediaries - closer together with its borrowers. But what seems like a propoor initiative with positive social results may just be a veneer for the reproduction of capital
accumulation. In her analysis of how this process of inclusion works, Aitken notes that a set of
differentiated interest rates, sometimes including up to 30% to 50%, are charged to large groups
of populations that cannot afford these credit loans.38 Behind the hidden truths of microfinance,
the poverty reduction agenda is turned upside down. Financial norms, once the anathema of
development, take the place of social norms. Moreover, the empowerment of women promised
by microfinance stands in murky waters and tides of uncertainty. For all the improvements that
microfinance is credited with, the empowerment of women is now highly debatable. Growing
numbers of women worldwide face crises of debt and are unable to maintain any durable savings
accounts, some going as far as committing suicide in the face of social opprobrium and personal
cycles of depression. Empowerment, to that extent, is now an empty signifier that is freely used
by development agencies in exercises of self-appraisal, without even considering its
depoliticizing consequences.
In the next section, I will explain how a discourse analysis can be a useful tool to
understand how the two contradictory logics of democracy and human capital contradict with the
need to attain financial and efficient markets by investors. However, before explaining my
methodology, it is important to note that my discourse analysis is centered on one country: Haiti.
III. Methodology
A. Case Selection
To fully capture the history of development in Haiti, it is vital to examine the historical
legacy of colonialism and perpetual debt. In 1804, Haiti became the first successful slave
rebellion in world history. Its independence marked a radical departure from centuries of
colonialism under Spanish and later French rule in the Caribbean. Located in the island of
Hispaniola, Haiti was the most profitable colony of the French, surpassing all other colonies in
its production of sugar and coffee. In 1825, France demanded “reparations” for property damage
incurred during the 1804 revolution. The French threatened to invade Haiti if the latter did not
fulfill its reparations obligations. In what may be considered one of the first examples of
“structural adjustment” in modern history, Haiti had to borrow cash to repay this debt, which was
bound by the constraints of the French. After the 120 years, Haiti finally repaid its debt of 150
million francs, the modern equivalent of $21 billion.
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Through the “structural adjustments programs” that Haiti acceded to during the late
1980s and 1990s, Haiti’s history has been characterized by unabated debt and political turmoil.
With a population of 10 million inhabitants, Haiti has a current GDP per capita rate of $771 in
U.S. Dollars, with 80% of the population living on less than $2 a day.39 In January 2010, Haiti
was struck by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake that further devastated its economy and wrought a
severe human toll, with estimates of approximately 316,000 deaths as a result of the
earthquake.40 In economic terms, he earthquake resulted in a 9% economic contraction, and the
loss of decades of work by NGOs operating on the ground.
As Haitians continue to recover from the damages of the earthquake, another reckoning
force continues to take a severe human toll on Haitians: the cholera epidemic that has spread
throughout the country. One of the most enduring consequences of the earthquake has been its
horrific effects on the fragile infrastructure of water, sanitation and public health.41 The first
documented case of cholera occurred in October 2010 – only nine months after the earthquake.
After extensive medical research, repeated tests showed that cholera was introduced by UN
peacekeepers from Nepal, where cholera is endemic. Since the first case was reported two years
ago, the disease has spread unrelentingly, and the consequences have been catastrophic: 500,000
Haitians have been sickened, while over 7,000 have died. To the extent cholera has spread, the
problem must be assessed systemically: the lack of proper water and sanitation systems in Haiti
has exacerbated the situation.42
Given the scope of the devastation in Haiti and the continuing cholera epidemic, Haiti is a
case study that should be not ignored. Whereas previous analysts have focused on other regions
(Africa and Asia) or other countries in Latin America (Mexico and Peru), Haiti and the
Caribbean have been prominently ignored. It is in this context that I consider an investigation of
microfinance in Haiti important for analysis. But before undertaking a discourse analysis, it is
important to describe what it is and how it differs from other methods in the qualitative research
in the social sciences.
B. Discourse Analysis and Governmentality
A discourse analysis of microfinance, as an analytical tool, has the potential to
demonstrate how borrowers of microcredit are now subjects governed by development and
financial institutions. The method of critical discourse analysis championed by Foucault begins
with the assumption that issues of power mask themselves at a superficial level. Unlike social
psychologists or linguists, critical discourse analysts understand their project as fundamentally
political.
Critical Discourse analysts…analyze texts from a political perspective. Because they argue that
language is a central vehicle in the process whereby people are constituted as individuals and as
social subjects, and because language and ideology are closely imbricated, the close systematic
analysis of the language of texts can expels some of the workings of texts and, by extension, the
way that people are oppressed within current social structures. They integrate post-structuralist
questions of power, truth and knowledge and Marxist concerns with inequality and oppression
with their linguistic analytical methods.43

A discourse analysis therefore identifies the historical conditions of possibility under
which the phenomenon in question comes to the fore to understand how discourse works. The
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effects and implication are therefore critical to understand the effects of a discourse on ways of
thinking. But to understand its repercussions it is important to remember the conceptual meaning
of governmentality. In his 1978 set of lectures Security, Territory, Population at the College de
France, Foucault penned the term "governmentality" to refer to what he calls "the art of
governing." Foucault defines governmentality as
The ensemble formed by institutions, procures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and
tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has
the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and
apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.44

In contextualizing his lecture within the history of sovereignty, Foucault sees
governmentality, following La Perriére, as the "right disposition of things that one arranges so as
to lead them to a suitable end.” In order to govern the subjects within a territory, one needs to
arrange them spatially in certain ways that allow the state to have knowledge over them. For
Foucault, however, this governmentalization of the state is best understood within the context of
legitimacy and sovereignty in the history of Western political philosophy.
In the world of microfinance, we can see this "ensemble" created and sustained by a
constellation of international financial institutions, microfinancial institutions and NGOs that
operate with the same objective in mind. It arranges its subjects and absorbs them into its rule.
Perhaps more importantly, it renders them dependable on access to microcredit. Their
arrangement, which includes ways to govern these subjects as a population, is different from
those whose access to credit does not require microfinancial institutions. Whether as part of the
World Bank or not, these institutions use methods to calculate the best strategies and tactics to
lend micro capital and gain knowledge about the poor. Unlike Roy and others, who have
examined microfinance as merely a new technology of government, I use the method of
discourse analysis to understand how microfinance can continue to find so much appeal both to
its borrowers and to those elite institutions that it continues receiving support. In her work, Roy
did not evaluate the importance of using the discourses of human capital and social capital to
create a logic of democratization that hides the basic elements of microfinance. Although the
financialization of microfinance has received ample coverage in recent years, microfinancial
institutions continue emphasizing its democratic potentials to hide or omit the effects that
financialization has on its clients. It is this fundamental opposition between these two logics that
I’m concerned with exploring using a discourse analysis.

IV. The Reality of Microfinance in Haiti
Given the detrimental state of public health and deteriorating conditions of poverty, there
is an active presence of development NGOs and institutions in the country. To do a discourse
analysis of microfinancial institutions in Haiti, it is important to recall the institutions that are
operating on the ground. Not all NGOs are funded by the same Northern philanthropic
institutions; therefore, not all organizations have the same amount of resources at their disposal. I
read the statements and reports issued by the following NGOs: ACME, Finca-HTI, Fondespor,
Fonkoze, Fonkoze Financial Services (SFF), IDM, MCN and SOGESOL. I also examined the
9

press releases, reports and statements released by the philanthropic institutions such as the
Clinton Global Initiative, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Institute of Development
Studies, and the BRAC Development Institute. Lastly, I read the literature released by financial
institutions like the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor and the World Bank.
Similar to other how microfinance operates in other countries, microfinancial institutions
have capitalized on the number of borrowers that have become immediately “bankable” in Haiti.
In the same way that Mexican MFIs have lent at rates unimaginable to their clients, the reality of
microfinance in Haiti is that these loans exceed what clients can afford and make use of. Indeed,
when borrowers were approved to receive microcredit loans, the interest rates have ranged
between 30% to 55%. One the one hand, organizations like Fonkoze proclaim in their mission
statement to seek “building the economic foundations for democracy in Haiti by providing the
rural poor with the tools they need to lift themselves out of poverty.”45 On the other hand, Alex
Conts, the current president of the Grameen Foundation, admitted that "Haiti is one of the most
complicated environments for anyone to do business [italics mine].”46 As a country with severe
infrastructural damage, low economic growth and poor state institutions, it therefore presents an
opportunity for MFIs with a financial stability approach referenced above, which place
sustainability over outreach and poverty-reduction, to gain momentum and credibility to
fundraise substantial amounts from donors, philanthropists and state development agencies. But
with such an exorbitant scale of interest rates, can microfinancial institutions really help and
assist poverty-stricken Haitians amidst post-disaster reconstruction? As the investors
transparency website www.mixmarket.org shows, the MFIs in Haiti are not lending to women to
the low interest rates that are originally part of the scheme of microfinance. They still remain
exorbitantly high and inconsistent with its principles:

Table 1: Microfinance Rates in Haiti
Institution

Number of Borrowers

Interest Rates

Fondespoir

N/A

54.17%

SOGESOL

N/A

53.14%

MCN

N/A

46.13%

ACME

21,906

44.88%

Fonkoze

15,866

31.85%

In the broader picture, articles like “Can Micro-Lending Save Haiti” in The New York
Times place a high degree of hope and optimism that microfinance institutions can generate the
type of growth, development and sustainability that is required in post-reconstruction
development. For example, according to Philanthropy News Digest, 18% of microfinance clients
have defaulted or at the risk of defaulting in Haiti, compared to the international rate of merely
3%, coupled with a staggering $38 million in micro-credit loans that are outstanding in the
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country.47 Therefore, although post-reconstruction development has played a significant role in
recovery efforts, microfinance has not been the answer everyone expected. When the Grameen
Bank was founded by Yunus in the 1970s, his goal was to keep differentiated interest rates
between 10-15% of every loan. By issuing small loans, paying back these loans would not be a
problem. However, as the institutions demonstrate, the need to emphasize the gains in social and
human capital by women creates a discourse that hides the costs involved to create financial
inclusion.
There is a fundamental tension between the short-term social goals promised by
microfinance and the long-term financial objectives of sustainability of investors. Although they
promote democracy by increasing the extent of social and human capital, the financialization of
microfinance continues unabated. These two contradictory logics of microfinance stand at odds
and therefore should be investigated. In my next section, I will describe how and why human
capital and social capital are emphasized in Haiti. More importantly, I will argue that they are
used to mask the trappings of financial power that are being wielded by lenders.

IV. The Two Contradictory Logics of Microfinance
In its mission statement, the microfinancial institution Finca Haiti declares that
“microfinance is an integral part of the relatively underdeveloped financial system.”48
Correspondingly, the philanthropic Clinton-Bush Fund, which was established shortly after the
earthquake, supports the mission of Finca Haiti on the ground. But it emphasizes to “help Haitian
entrepreneurs, predominantly women, access the finance they need to develop their small and
growing businesses, allowing them to support their families and communities.”49 This emphasis
on the entrepreneurial woman is necessary for continuing the inclusion of poor subjects into
grander financial markets. Microfinancial institutions justify their conversion into financial
inclusion on various grounds. In the next section, I will describe based on the documents
released by institutions like Fonkoze and AIDG how financial sustainability and increasing
bankable clients are essential for these institutions to operate in Haiti.
A. Investing in Profitable and Efficient Markets
One of the best examples of financial inclusion is Fonkoze, the largest microfinancial
institution operating in Haiti.50 Operating since 1994, Fonkoze, which calls itself “Haiti’s
alternative Bank for the Organized Poor,” boasts up to 750 employees, 45,000 loan clients and
up to 41 branches extended throughout the country. As proclaimed in its website, Fonkoze’s
mission is to “provide Haiti’s poor with the financial and educational services they need to make
their way out of poverty.” Fonkoze’s financial services for the poor include micro-lending,
priced savings, remittance transfers, and currency conversion. Traditionally relegated and
excluded, the bank has emphasized supporting the rural population of Haiti. For example, in an
article written for a special report on Haiti sponsored by the Clinton Global Initiative, Fonkoze’s
strategic analysts affirm that “Fonkoze found itself positioned to serve Haiti’s rural population
before other banks were back on their feet.”51 As opposed to other development organizations,
Fonkoze does not simply focus on Port-au-Prince. Its services are extended to “the rest of the
country” in the rural communities “with far less economic activity.”52 This rural-urban divide is
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of concern for the organization. Because banks have no interest in lending to poor women living
in rural areas of Haiti, Fonkoze emphasizes its extended outreach and ability to connect with
disempowered women.
To calculate their clients for sustainability, MFIs make a distinction from the “bankable”
and “economically active” poor from those who are “unbankable” and therefore useless for
sustainable purposes.53 Although Fonkoze proclaims its social mission before its financial
sustainability, it does not follow a cohesive posture. Fonkoze’s CEO, Anne Hastings, maintains
that a “lack of sustainability is not a reason to close.” Yet later in the report she emphasizes the
need for “sustainable business practices, a goal for which Fonkoze continually strives.”54 In a
quote that echoes the concerns about financial sustainability, one of the investors of Fonkoze told
Hastings, “You can’t open the branch in a place like without doing a market study first…you
need to be sure that the branch can eventually become sustainable.”
Furthermore, acknowledging that lending in the Haitian currency, the gourde, would not
be profitable after borrowing in American dollars, Hastings states that “it doesn’t make sense to
borrow in dollars and then lend in gourdes if by the time the gourdes are repaid they no longer
have the same value.” She justifies Fonkoze’s acquired commercial license because “there was
simply not enough capital to reach the scale that would be necessary to make the institution
profitable” [emphasis mines]. After going through a process of commercialization for financial
sustainability, Fonkoze changed its name to Finansye Fonkoze (SFF), which translates as
Fonkoze Financial Services. Unlike its original vision, which did not depend on financial
sustainability, the purpose of loans is to maximize financial returns by partaking “in the business
of getting people out of poverty.” Fonkoze now offers insurance plans to protect micro-credit
investments for lenders and borrowers. Its goal was not simply to issue microcredit, but more
importantly to deliver other financial services, including savings and currency conversion that
are seen as part of its institutional growth and greater reach:
Other foundations and micro-credit institutions throughout the developing world have faced the
same challenges of sustainability, scale, and capital. Prodem in Brazil, the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh, and CARD in the Philippines began as foundations and not-for-profits but had made
the transition to full-fledged microcredit commercial banks.55

Other microfinancial centers make their intentions to capitalize on investments more
explicitly. State regulations on investment are considered a burden to the free market and private
enterprise. Affirming the value of entrepreneurship at a smaller level, or what they call “microentrepreneurship,” MFIs in Haiti like Société Générale Haitïenne de Solidarité (SOGESOL)
affirm the need to maintain returns for their investment. As stated in their mission statement,
SOGESOL seeks “to promote Haitian micro-entreneurship, to adapt traditional banking services
to the micro-entrepreneurs needs, to satisfy the clientele while respecting efficiency and
profitability standards” [emphasis mines].56 Other institutions like GCAP make it more clear
what they mean by “efficiency and profitability standards”:
By equitable we mean ensuring that the increasing commercial focus of microfinance, or ‘access to
finance,’ doe not leave some poor people, regions or countries behind…and that sound business
practices are respected. By efficiency we mean helping to make local financial systems operate
more efficiently.57
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The emphasis on efficiency is of great importance for microfinancial institutions. Whereas
its earlier goals were geared toward delivery of services, its present focus on efficiency
does not take into account whether its goals are compatible with those subjects it seeks to
empower.
B. Promoting Social Capital and Democracy
In various instances, annual reports released by MFIs show a concern with either the
education of their constituencies, their staff members or the role of education in fostering a
democratic society. More importantly, although the recipients of microfinance have the ability to
borrow micro-loans, the words and expressions that are routinely used connote that these poor
women are fundamentally entrepreneurial but ignorant about economics. For example, Denis
O’Brien, the chairman of the privately-owned Digicel Group, states in one of the reports for the
Global Clinton Initiative that Haitians are “poorly educated” and lack the opportunities for
“income generation.”58 O’Brien further argues that Haiti’s problems are “over-analyzed” and that
the “reasons behind each of these problems may be complex.”59 These “over-analyzed” problems
include issues as distinct and unassociated as weak political leadership, lack of food security,
poor education, poor access to healthcare, violence, and environmental degradation. O’Brien also
states that Haiti has an “enviable market access” and a “young population” that can elicit the
“international will” that is necessary to overcome its current problems. Yet, O’Brien startlingly
ignores Haiti’s history of foreign interventions, its half a century of recurrent dictatorships, and
the beleaguered position it has assumed for the past two decades. O’Brien assumes that Haiti has
fair and equal conditions for international trade, when clearly from its case of rice and pigs with
the United States, this is absolutely not the case. Finally, O’Brien triumphantly announces that
“making sure the private sector is at the forefront of redevelopment efforts is the key,” assuming
that the culture of dependency he decries will somehow vanish or peter out through ongoing
foreign direct investment initiatives. All this points to the lack of recognition that analysts put to
the role that international organizations have and continue to play in Haiti’s socio-economic
development.
In the case of Fonkoze, which seeks to provide the “educational services they [Haitians]
need to make their way out of poverty,” they assert that Haitians “know nothing about organizing
economically” and traditionally have “no control over the economy.”60 This even more evident
with Fonkoze’s hiring practices. The literacy requirement is implicitly tailed toward those in
Port-au-Prince: “Fonkoze seeks to hire employees who are literate; that is, they can read and
write confidently in Haitian Creole.”61
The use of creole itself is used in many of the organization’s programs. For example,
Fonkoze explains to its clients, particularly women, that the organization is driven by the desire
to eradicate lamizè, the misery of poverty. To illustrate this, in its 2010 annual report, the
“Staircase out of Poverty” presents a hierarchy of regaining one’s humanity by escaping out of
poverty. Part of this hierarchy involves stepping out of abject poverty to attain the means of
entrepreneurial dexterity. Fonkoze begins by providing education services (ti kredi) to health
services (chemen lavi miyo).
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Figure 1: The Staircase Out of Poverty

Its focus, then, becomes the individual, not the structural and political conditions that
have led to poverty all around. “We believe that for Haiti to develop sustainably, we need to
apply the same thinking we use in developed nations,” asserts Catherine Lainè, the Deputy
Director of the Appropriate Infrastructure Development Group (AIDG).62 In order “To Build a
Better Haiti,” the title of Lainè’s report, developing institutions “need to invest in human capital
and long-term business development.”63 The entrepreneurial subject, in the “staircase out of
poverty,” not only borrows but invests in “the small and medium enterprise sector.” To appeal to
these clients, Fonkoze created new financial products such as “hot credit” lines of expediency,
disbursed after only 3 months. Laine’s assumptions, in substance, start with her opposition to
what she considers unnecessary and burdensome regulations to private enterprise, and its
undermining effect on Haitians skills, knowledge and experience.
The focus on the concept of human capital is a remarkable feature of millennial
development that sets it apart from its practices in the mid-20th century. Whereas the focus of the
World Bank and other financial institutions were tribes, communities or entire societies,
millennial development focuses on increasing the possibilities for the individual to maximize his
or her human capital. In economic thought, the concept of human capital was popularized by
Gary Becker from the Chicago School of Economics.64 Becker defined it as the bundle of skills,
knowledge and abilities inherited or acquired by the individual in modern capitalist production. It
is possessed and inseparable from the subject. Through his concept, Becker radical extended
economic analysis to the domains of society that were previously outside of the market and
studied by sociologists. By extending human capital to labor, a concept previously theorized as a
passive factor of production in its relation to land and capital, Becker sought to re-conceptualize
economic capital in its totality.
Various authors writing for the publications of microfinance emphasize the abundant
human capital that exists in Haiti. Under conditions of poverty, human capital is wasted, they
argue, because it is no longer used. As Roy remarked, the subject of poverty is seen as “dead
capital” that is rich in assets that can alternatively be converted into economic capital and
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financial capital: “The ‘mystery of capital’ is how such dormant and defective assets can be
transformed into liquid capital, thereby unleashing new frontiers of capital accumulation.”65 In
the case of Haiti, this concept of human capital abounds. In a Clinton Global Initiative report
aptly titled “Haiti’s Potential Waiting to be Fulfilled,” O’Brien laments the “huge untapped
potential” to exercise and make use of human capital.66 The young population is ready to work,
O’Brien argues. Its human capital is waiting to be exercised. This young population represents “a
large latent labor force of energetic, diligent, and committed workers who have the enthusiasm
and optimism to bring their country forward.”67 The World Bank would concur with that
statement. In the line of publications that have been published after the earthquake, The World
Bank diagnoses the problems of poverty in relation to its low human capital:
Although both women and men face poverty-induced difficulties due to limited human and
financial capital, women face greater obstacles. In Haitian agriculture in particular, it is widely
recognized that gender is the primary influence on the division of labor and employment prospects
[emphasis mine].68

In a similar fashion, Lainè observes some of the troublesome and unmanageable issues that have
affected Haiti can be solved by investing in entrepreneurs. These are difficult but malleable
problems, however. As financial operations like AIDG can aid these entrepreneurs by investing
in the facilities that are necessary to generate and flourish this squandering dead capital: “Many
would-be entrepreneurs or star-ups in developing countries that aim to effect positive social c
change often flounder because they lack the business skills, technical skills, networks and capital
to survive in the hostile business environments of their home countries.”69 Microfinance opens
the possibilities for attaining these goals, as the worth recipient of micro-loans is one who can
acquire and maximize his/her human capital and build on the spirit of entrepreneurship.
This tragedy of “untapped potential” of human capital reflects the potential for the
realization of some unfulfilled but attainable progress that is at the core of development. It worth
pointing out that this realization is built directly with the individual, not through the state. As
Roy put it, “microfinance writes out the role of the state and instead focuses on the creativity of
poor entrepreneurs and the success of local institutions in enabling such entrepreneurship.”70
Because the state impedes the free circuit of capital under markets, it is bracketed out as a
method for achieving progress, especially in sites of post-disaster reconstruction.
The concept of social capital has not only been instrumental in the discipline of sociology
to understand relations in society. In development, the World Bank uses it in its programs to
denote the links between development aid and the growth of civil society. As stated in the World
Bank’s website, “social capital, when enhanced in a positive manner, can improve project
effectiveness and sustainability by building the community’s capacity to work together to
address their common needs, fostering greater inclusion and cohesion, and increasing
transparency and accountability.”71 In its relation to economic development, civil society now
signifies the ties that escape the market but that are important to build cohesion and progress.
Thus, “social capital can be conceptualized as a remedy for market failure, as a non-economic
‘glue’ that holds societies together,” as Roy argues. 72
C. Illustration: Fonkoze’s Solidarity Centers
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Using the genealogical method of his later works, Foucault effectively argued that in
order to understand how power relations function in society, the specific sites under which they
operate are important for a critical analysis. Therefore, isolating these “meticulous rituals of
power,” as Foucault called them, enabled him to undertake the discourse analysis that is
necessary “to localize and specify how power works, what it does and how it does it,” in the
words of his American intelocutors.73 As they put it, “the rules and obligations which emerge
from these rituals are inscribed in civil law, in moral codes, in the universal laws of humanity
that claim to temper and prevent the violence that would supposedly exist without their civilizing
constraints.”74
In the workings of microfinance, we can see how these “meticulous rituals of power”
take place. International development institutions such as the World Bank maintain that social
capital is a vital component for development writ large. On a micro-level, Fonkoze applies the
concept of social capital through its “solidarity centers.” Fonkoze’s solidarity centers are
considered the seeds of a new democratic structures – and a new democratic political culture –
for the future. Unlike commercial banks, Fonkoze provides small loans to small female vendors
in the countryside, or ti machann. Whereas commercial banks provide large loans, Fonkoze
focuses on small loans and group lending. In this group, each loan recipient is grouped with four
other women to form a “Solidarity Group.” Each Solidarity Group, in turn, is aggregated with 610 other solidarity groups to form a “Solidarity Center.” The Solidarity Centers “meet near
client’s homes for loan disbursement, repayment, education, and solidarity meetings.” All these
financial services, according to Hastings, contribute to a “tremendously powerful sense of
community.” But the Solidarity Centers are not just a vehicle for community empowerment.
According to Hastings, they are “a truly democratic institution.”75 Upholding the tradition of
representative democracy in Western liberalism, members form regional assemblies where they
vote for representatives for a national assembly located in the capital, Port-au-Prince. For
Fonkoze, the Solidarity Centers are capable of enacting something that the state is unable to
achieve. Hastings explains the formal rules and procedures that animate its democratic ethos:
Each center selects a chief who represents it at caucuses for the entire branch. These branch-wide
caucuses elect representatives to a national assembly that meets once a year in Port-au-Prince and,
among other functions, elects a minority of the Fonkoze Board of Directors.

Though social capital is the “glue” that builds Haiti after the earthquake, this reliance on
social capital is deployed for ulterior reasons. Social capital is consistent with the logic of
profitability because it reassures investors that their loans will be paid with a higher interest rate
than promised. In other words, social capital reassures those who financialize microfinancial
institutions that there will not be a high and broad risk of default by the lenders. By including
women in groups as borrowers, what institutions like Fonkoze do is to create a de facto form of
collateral in case one of them defaults. Although microfinance is based in the absence of
collateral forms of guarantee, the Solidarity Centers offset this problem and minimize the risk of
loan defaults. It only leads microfinance institutions to deal with groups instrumentally, since it
reduces administrative costs while creating opportunities for motivating repayments. The
objective is not to recognize the political divisions and inequalities that exist at large in Haiti, but
to depoliticize these historical practices in order to create avenues for repayment that are more
feasible, less time-consuming and more effective. As the geographer Katherine Rankin put it,
“Donors thus consider microfinance to be a ‘win-win’ approach to development because
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investors can mobilize bonding social capital to enhance the financial viability of banking with
poor women, and poor women gain access to both social and financial resources that allow them
to help themselves through the market mechanism.”76 This de facto forms of collateral are
significant because they contradict the values and democratic élan of microfinance, since women
are grouped together as a way of governing and maintaining control over their investments.
Indeed, women constitute the vast majority of recipients of microfinance. The
empowerment of women is itself a discourse that has permeated the workings of microfinance
since its inception. For example, the entire 15,866 recipients of microloans from Fonkoze are
women. Similarly, Finca Haiti states in their website that “our average client is a married woman
with 3-7 children, who sells food stuffs, cookware, charcoal, used clothings, or soft drinks in a
local market near her home.”77 The poor, vulnerable woman is representative of the ideal subject
of microfinance. Although she lacks education, she is well-equipped to become an entrepreneur
and future investor. The gendered subject of microfinance reflects the idea of The Third World
Woman that developing institutions such as the World Bank have been stressing in their
operations. She can build human capital and increase her social capital, while at the same time
build solidarity links with other women to represent the success of microfinancial operations.78
Despite this obvious focus on women, the “hidden transcript” of microfinance omits that the
differentiated interest rates of its focus have not changed.
To ensure profitable and efficient markets, microfinancial institutions insist on the
freedom of its borrowers to dispose of their small loans as they wish. But as demonstrated by the
Solidarity Centers and the use of de facto forms of collateral for poor women, these forms of
participatory democracy do not advance any tangible political rights or liberties but merely
ensures the governance of its borrowers. The contradictory logics of microfinance are clearly
seen in Haiti through the workings of Fonkoze, Finca Haiti and other microfinancial institutions.
The differentiated interest rates that have thrived under microfinancial schemes can only
continue to exist insofar as the discourses of human and social capital are employed. Because
human capital and social capital enjoy such unqualified support by Northern development
agencies such as the GCAP, the creation of entrepreneurial subjects who possess the freedom to
invest and subsist on their own is vital for the development project of microfinance. More
importantly, these entrepreneurial subjects are consistent with the neoliberal vision of
undermining the state by guaranteeing the “self-reliance” and “ingenuity” of individual citizens
who the passive consumers conceptualized by homo economicus instead of political subjects
with control over their own affairs and livelihood.

VI. Conclusion
In this article, I examined how the discourse of microfinance is centered on poverty as its
structure of knowledge while governing microfinancial clients by controlling their conduct. In
order to understand this discourse and its continuing appeal, I drew on Foucault’s conceptual
schema of discourse, power and governmentality.
First, I located this discourse in its social-historical conditions, and emphasized its effects
of the production and reproduction of knowledge. Second, I used Foucault’s concept of power as
a productive force instead of a static, linear and repressive force. Third, I used Foucault’s
concept of governmentality as the art of governing outside the bounds of state and political
institutions. In the final analysis, the conceptual schema of discourse, power and governmentality
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allows me to re-think microfinance as a discourse of development that treats the poor as an
object of knowledge and social capital as its central organizing principle.
There are two levels that one needs to understand about the discourse of microfinance: a
conceptual level and empirical level. At a conceptual level, microfinance is founded on two
contradictory logics of financial sustainability and socio-economic development. First, the logic
of financial sustainability includes prospects for growth, profitability and the expansion of
unregulated markets that can be directed precisely at poor populations. Second, the logic of
socio-economic development is hinged upon the idea of empowering women, strengthening
social and human capital and promoting participatory democracy at the local and national level.
In this article, I explored how these discourses operate and whether they enter into conversation
with one another. More importantly, I focused on what these discourses do and the effects they
create, rather than focusing on the truth or falsity of these discourses.
At an empirical level, microfinancial initiatives have been implemented across a wide
array of developing nations. In the 21st century, microfinancial initiatives currently operate
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, including in the poorest nation in the Western
Hemisphere, Haiti. In Haiti, microfinancial initiatives play a role in how microfinance is
interpreted by clients. But what remains puzzling about Haiti is that microfinancial initiatives are
radically reconfiguring family and community relations, a realm that is usually consigned to civil
society and left untouched by the state.
One example of this reconfiguration is the large initiative Fonkoze. Fonkoze forces its
clients in rural communities to strengthen the social capital in towns by forming Solidarity
Centers. However, by forcing its clients to organize collectively in Solidarity Centers, Fonkoze
creates a de facto form of collateral in case one of the clients defaults. Although the idea of
microfinance excludes collateral forms of guarantee, the solidarity centers offset this problem
and minimize the risk of loan defaults. These collateral forms of guarantee are significant
because they contradict the values and democratic spirit of microfinance, since women are
grouped together as a way of governing and maintaining control over their investments.
All in all, this analysis of microfinance in Haiti complicates the primordial discourse of
aid and development. In substance, development in Haiti no longer simply comes packaged in
the form of “aid.” Neither is it merely exercised through the elimination of tariffs or the creation
of export-processing zones. Instead, development in the form of microfinance is considered an
investment in human and social capital that will lead to free and entrepreneurial individuals with
the potential to thrive independently of state interference. As evidenced in Haiti, this form of
development is creating new forms of governance that are unaccountable, undemocratic and
potentially unsustainable.
A discourse analysis of primary documents of key microfinancial institution will reveal
these same discourses at work. As argued above, through the trappings of human capital and
social capital, microfinance is clothed behind the veils of democratic development, yet its spread
and maintenance depends on the production and reproduction of financial markets based on
unattainable interest rates and a culture of dependency between the borrower and the lender. This
relationship between the political rationality of democracy and financial markets is captured in
microfinance in a manner unseen with other projects of development. For this reason, it remains
vital to continue to investigate the breadth and depth of microfinance in other sites. But insofar
as its logic depends on other discourses, the popularity of microfinance must be gauged carefully
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and put to the test of whether or not it advances or prevents the interests of its borrowers and the
well-being of populations. It makes no sense to speak of “development” if that is not the case.
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